Nearly all bank staff members who misuse customers’ funds believe that such action is only temporary and can be rectified shortly. However, crime is committed once the funds are misused and such action cannot be ‘rectified’ even if the funds are ‘repaid’ before the crime comes into light. In this case study, the relationship manager (an agent) might have violated Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) by using forged documents to deceive his bank (the principal) in approving an increase in Client A’s credit limit and Client A’s fraudulent new loan. Also, the relationship manger could be liable for a series of other crimes including theft (transferring money from client’s account to his own), fraud and forgery. 

From the perspectives of customer service, it may be desirable for a relationship manager to provide personal service and act as the bank’s single point of contact for important clients. However, if all verification/clarification of questionable or doubtful transactions are routed through the relationship manager, it will undermine checks and balances and create opportunities for manipulations by unscrupulous relationship manager. 

Moreover, banks should adopt good control practices to remind supervisors to stay vigilant to potential risk of corrupt practices and make thorough enquiries into any suspected irregularities.

In this case study, the project manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal), accepted an advantage from the Mainland contractor, as a reward for making a recommendation to the bank’s head office in Hong Kong to accept the contractor's substandard works and employ the same contractor to renovate other branches (an act in relation to the bank’s business and took place in Hong Kong), might contravene Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO). The Mainland contractor might also contravene Section 9(2) of the POBO for offering bribes. If any part of the act of bribery (including offering, soliciting or accepting a bribe) takes place in Hong Kong, it may still be pursued by the ICAC under the POBO. 

Procurement of goods and services is one of the most corruption-prone business processes, in particular those involving high values or specialist knowledge and specialised products or services, e.g. renovation and maintenance works. 

It is common for banks to send staff members to work in the Mainland office. The staff members are exposed to significant risk of temptation due to their perceived remoteness from the main office in Hong Kong and the absence of supervisory control measures. Relying on a single staff member, who is a specialist, without effective checks and balances and segregation of duties, also increases the corruption risk. 

Banks should lay down guidelines for key procurement stages. They should also assign supervisors to conduct site inspections to ensure compliance with the laid down guidelines and to detect malpractice, such as connivance of substandard performance of contractors. It is also important to circulate the staff code of conduct regularly to remind staff members to refrain from accepting frequent/lavish entertainment from contractors/suppliers which may otherwise affect one’s objective commercial judgment. In addition, it is also advisable to communicate to suppliers/contractors, in particular non-local ones, on the bank’s policy regarding anti-bribery, acceptance of advantages/entertainment, zero tolerance to corruption and channel(s) for feedback/enquiry.

The bank manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal) and without the permission of the bank, accepted advantage from the client as a reward for helping the latter to perform suspicious transactions through the bank (an act in relation to bank’s business). The bank manager might contravene Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) for accepting bribes, while the client might contravene Section 9(2) of the same Ordinance for offering bribes. 

The bank manager might breach the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance or the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance as well as the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance if he, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that any property which, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represents any person’s proceeds of drug trafficking or indictable offence, deals with that property. 

Money laundering is a serious crime. Banks should make all staff members aware that the bank must comply with the laws and would constantly monitor fund transfers and audit the related control/processes, so as to provide a deterrent.

In this case, the senior credit manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal), without the permission from the bank, accepted an advantage (a watch) from factory owner as a reward for turning a blind eye to the out-dated equipment and giving him a favourable site inspection report (an act in relation to the bank’s business). Although the acceptance of gifts took place outside Hong Kong, part of the bribery act occurred in Hong Kong (e.g. submission of a favourable report to the bank). The senior credit manager might breach Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) for accepting bribes, whereas the factory owner might contravene Section 9(2) of the POBO for offering bribes. The senior credit manager might have also contravened the Banking Ordinance. 

Although the senior credit manager was the supervisor of the credit manager, he did not have the authority to permit his subordinates to accept the advantage. 

It is very common for banks’ corporate clients to have their business operations such as production plants or other assets in the Mainland or elsewhere outside Hong Kong. When site inspection/ visit by bank staff is required in assessing a loan application, the staff members are exposed to significant risk of temptation, which may comprise bribes, gifts, and excessive entertainment or services. 

In fact, assigning staff members of the same unit (in particular one of them is the supervisor of the other one) to conduct high corruption-risk tasks is a formula of disaster. The credit manager did not decline the gift offer at the spot probably because of the pressure from his supervisor, and might eventually be tempted to collude with his supervisor. 

Due to the differences in various cultures, some customers from other regions may regard offering gifts/ rewards in return for assistance or favour as a common business practice. Banks should make it clear to their staff members that it is unnecessary and inappropriate for bank staff members to adopt local cultures which may violate the laws. Moreover, an independent, reliable and confidential channel of reporting malpractices should be established by banks to encourage whistle-blowing. Furthermore, it is essential for banks to communicate clearly to all staff members and customers, especially non-local ones, about the bank’s policies on anti-bribery, acceptance of advantages / entertainment and zero tolerance to corruption.

In this case, the relationship manager, an employee (agent) of the bank (the principal), without the permission of the bank, accepted monetary bonuses (advantages) from the acquainted client as a reward for his preferential service in managing the investment portfolio (an act in relation to the bank’s business). The relationship manager might violate Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) for accepting bribes; whereas the acquainted client might contravene Section 9(2) of the POBO for offering bribes. 

The personal relationship between the relationship manager and the acquainted client would give rise to conflict of interest, which was conducive to favouritism towards the customer, e.g. providing first priority in the investment portfolio management. 

To prevent corruption and malpractices, banks should enhance the awareness of integrity among staff members and promote ethical culture by: 

• disseminating a clear message by top management on commitment to business ethics and integrity, and zero-tolerance to unethical practices; 
• specifying the integrity standard expected of all staff members in a Code of Conduct, in particular, the restrictions on acceptance of advantages from bank customers, and the requirement for staff to declare and avoid conflict of interest. 

It is also necessary to conduct regular (induction, refresher) staff trainings on integrity and anti-corruption and to communicate with customers, including non-local customers, about the bank’s policies on anti-bribery and acceptance of advantages policy.

The relationship manager (agent) might have contravened Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) by using a false document (forged customer instruction) to deceive the bank (the principal). He might also be liable of a series of other crimes including theft, fraud and forgery. 

Some elderly customers may be vulnerable to exploitation as they may trust bank staff members (e.g. the relationship manager) to execute transactions on their behalves (e.g. signing blank instruction forms or giving their e-banking passwords) so as to save physical visits to the bank. 

The practice of keeping account advices for customers to collect later on is vulnerable to falsification or concealing irregularities. 

Furthermore, inactive, dormant accounts with a large balance or credit line are subject to the risk of exploitation, as the account owners may not monitor their accounts properly or may have changed addresses without informing the bank. 

Banks should devise control measures to protect dormant accounts from possible abuse and to avoid fraud. These control measures may include alerts on unusual fund movements, verification and confirmation with the customers, requirements for supervisors’ review/ override for transactions on inactive accounts, and requirements for identification of account holder when making withdrawals in person. Moreover, implementing requirements for staff members to take annual vacation leave, arranging and introducing a backup/ second officer to vulnerable customers, and practising staff rotation (say, on a three-year basis) may also help detect irregularities and misconduct at an early stage.

Under Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), it might be an offence for the senior bank manager (i.e. an agent, as an employee of the bank), without the permission of his principal (i.e. the bank), to accept advantages (i.e. expensive gifts offered by the client) as rewards for assisting the client to secure extension of loan repayment. The client might also violate Section 9(2) of POBO for offering bribes. 

The senior bank manager might have also contravened Section 124 of the Banking Ordinance which prohibits any employee of an authorized institution to receive any gift, commission, advantage etc. for his own personal benefit, for procuring or endeavouring to procure for any person any advance, loan, financial guarantee or credit facility from that institution. 

For efficiency purpose, bank managers are often delegated with authorities to endorse certain loan-related applications up to certain limits. The risk of corruption is in proportion to the discretion which bank managers are allowed to exercise. The greater the discretion, the higher the corruption risk. 

The restructuring of distressed loans is a corruption-prone area which is easily overlooked. A desperate debtor could entice the bank manager to secure favourable credit terms, e.g. extension of credit facilities. 

Corruption in the lending function will result in an increase in bad loans, affecting the bank’s business and profitability. When a customer is willing to bribe for favour in credit approval, it reflects both the underlying financial problems of his business and his poor integrity. His chance of defaulting repayment will be high. An internal review of the case will unearth the impropriety and corruption dealing. With a stringent control mechanism of a bank and a whistle-blowing mechanism, there is a good chance that the corrupt dealings will be detected.

Under Section 9 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), it is an offence for any agent, without the approval of his principal, to solicit or accept an advantage as a reward for or an inducement to perform an act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business. The offeror will also be guilty of the offence. 

In this case, the manager, an employee (agent) of the finance company (the principal), accepted commission (advantage) from the property developer as a reward for favourably recommending the loan proposal (an act in relation to the finance company’s business). Under the POBO, the manager was considered to have accepted the advantage even his wife received the advantage on his behalf. Hence, the manager might have contravened Section 9(1) of the POBO for accepting bribes. The property developer might have contravened Section 9(2) of the POBO for offering bribes. 

On the other hand, the manager might have breached Section 9(2) of the POBO for bribing the property valuer (agent of the property valuation agency) to inflate the value of the collateral, while the latter might have contravened Section 9(1) of the POBO for accepting bribes from the manager. They also might have contravened Section 9(3) by each submitting false, misleading valuation reports to their employers. 

The manager might have also breached the Banking Ordinance which prohibits any employee of an authorized institution to receive any gift, commission etc. for his own personal benefit or advantage or for that of any of his relatives, for procuring or endeavouring to procure for any person any advance, loan, financial guarantee or credit facility from that institution.

Soliciting bribes from overseas companies is also subject to prosecution 

Though the supplier, from which Mr Fong solicited bribes, was outside Hong Kong, Mr Fong might still commit an offence of soliciting an advantage under Section 9 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) as he sent text messages requesting for loans to be deposited into his wife’s bank account in Hong Kong in return for placing more orders. 

Businesspersons should be aware that the POBO can apply when part of the corrupt act, e.g. promising, agreeing, soliciting or accepting advantages without permission, takes place in Hong Kong.

Accepting bribes, whether directly or indirectly, is against the law 

Loan is considered an advantage under the POBO. Accepting bribes regardless of whether the advantage is directly given to the acceptor or indirectly delivered to a third party is still against the law. In the case study, if the Mainland herbal supplier agreed to deposit the loans into Mr Fong’s wife’s bank account in Hong Kong, as long as it was proven that the receiving account was controlled by Mr Fong or that he was the ultimate beneficiary, Mr Fong would be considered as having accepted the advantage.

By soliciting an advantage and leaking the quotation information to Mr Ho, Mr Lee might have committed an offence under Section 9 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. Meanwhile, Mr Ho might also have committed an offence by offering bribes. The section (Section 9) states that: 

• an agent (normally an employee) solicits or accepts an advantage without the permission of his principal (normally the employer) when conducting his principal’s affairs or business commits an offence; and 
• the person who offers the advantage also commits an offence. 

A company should establish a good quotation and tendering system to enable the selection of the best contractor for the job required. A good quotation/tendering system should prevent tender and quotation information from leakage. Quotations or tenders received should not be opened before the deadline to reduce the likelihood of information leakage. Furthermore, the opening of the tenders and quotations should be carried out by at least two persons to prevent tampering with the prices submitted