Clement had been entrusted with handling the village-type house development project and should have cherished the opportunity to show his abilities. Unfortunately, his gambling habit led him to personal finance problems. Driven into a corner, he conspired with Mr Shum to deceive Mr Lai’s company and abused his employer’s trust in him. Clement knew very well that the $500,000 solicited by Mr Lai was not for donation purpose. By using a false receipt to deceive his principal Mr Lai, Clement might be in breach of Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. Mr Shum might also commit a deception offence under the Theft Ordinance for falsely represented himself to Mr Lai as a village representative. 

As Clement and Mr Shum had business dealings, socialising might have been unavoidable. But Clement should have kept a suitable distance from Mr Shum and, above all, should not have had any pecuniary associations so that he would not have to show favouritism, or to get caught in a work dilemma where it was difficult to stay neutral, or to do illegal acts for personal gain. He should avoid engaging in frequent gambling activities with his clients to avoid involving in any monetary dealings that might lead to conflict of interest situation. 

Clement would also breach the Code of Ethics promulgated by the Estate Agents Authority for engaging in illegal activities and bringing discredit and/or disrepute to the estate agency trade. His failure to observe and comply with the law and the Code of Ethics might render him not being a fit and proper person under the Estate Agents Ordinance to hold license and disciplinary action might be taken against him.

It might seem that Bill was being clever, but actually he was being foolish. He committed a criminal offence of fraud under the Theft Ordinance and seriously undermined professional ethics by disregarding the interests of his clients. 

Bill’s unethical behaviour breached the Code of Ethics promulgated by the Estate Agents Authority. His failure to observe and comply with the law and the Code of Ethics might render him not being a fit and proper person under the Estate Agents Ordinance to hold license and disciplinary action might be taken against him. 

On the other hand, the management of the estate agency showed zero tolerance for such malpractices by treating Anna’s complaint seriously and taking action against Bill’s unethical and illegal behaviour. Its integrity management enabled staff to understand clearly the ethical standards the company required of them and whistle-blow any misconduct in confidence. This could deter staff from further unethical behaviour. It could also attract and help retain ethical employees, thus helping the company to earn greater profits and goodwill in a long run.

As a licensed estate agent, Timmy should observe the Code of Ethics of the Estate Agents Authority. Estate Agents and salespersons, in engaging and accepting an appointment as an agent, should protect and promote the interests of their clients, carry out the instructions of their clients in accordance with the estate agency agreement and act in an impartial and just manner to all parties involved in the transaction. Also, they should avoid accepting an appointment involving a property in which they have a beneficial interest. Any pecuniary or other beneficial interests in relation to the property shall be disclosed fully to all parties concerned. 

Timmy’s dishonest behaviour not only caused loss to Mrs Chung and Ms Lam but also tarnished the reputation of the trade. Timmy’s conduct might constitute a criminal offence of fraud under Section 16A of the Theft Ordinance.

Under Section 9 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), it would be an offence for Mr To (an employee), without the approval of his employer (the listed company) to accept advantage (i.e. $100,000 offered by Tony) as a reward for leaking out confidential information relating to the company’s property acquisition plan. He had also abused the trust placed on him by his employer for misusing the company’s information for personal gain. Tony might also violate POBO by offering bribes. 

Furthermore, according to the Code of Ethics of Estate Agents Authority, estate agents or salespersons shall refrain from activities during their practice which may infringe the law. They shall, in the course of business, provide services to clients with honesty, fidelity and integrity, and protect their clients against fraud, misrepresentation or any unethical practices in connection with real estate transactions. Tony had breached the Code of Ethics for offering bribes and engaging in fraudulent activities in deceiving compensation.

Facing keen competition in the industry and pressure to secure loan business in the bank, a bank staff may cross the line. Over reliance on sales staff to provide borrowers’ information without counter checks would increase the risk of manipulation. 

The Sales Executive, an employee (agent) of the finance company (the principal), intended to deceive/mislead the company by using invoices which contained false information. Notwithstanding he did not receive any bribes, he might have contravened Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO). 

The Sales Executive, machine supplier and SME owners could be charged with fraud against the finance company, or conspiracy to defraud the finance company. 

The Sales Executive rationalized his acts by regarding his practice as helping the finance company to secure more loan business, at the same time helping the SMEs to overcome difficult situations. However, the fact that customers had to obtain higher loans through a fraudulent means suggested that they are high risk customers. Granting them higher loans increased the risk exposure of the finance company. 

Approving a higher loan based on inflated collateral value or bogus transactions might also result in an unusual increase in bad debt cases, and internal review by the finance company would detect the irregularity involved. 

Banks should adopt good control practices such as setting up a central team to conduct vigilant due diligence on high credit risk customers, conducting independent assessment of machine suppliers involved in HP transactions to ascertain their reliability, gauging reasonableness of the sales prices on invoice, and conducting regular assurance check to detect irregularities/unusual trend.

Nearly all bank staff members who misuse customers’ funds believe that such action is only temporary and can be rectified shortly. However, crime is committed once the funds are misused and such action cannot be ‘rectified’ even if the funds are ‘repaid’ before the crime comes into light. In this case study, the relationship manager (an agent) might have violated Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) by using forged documents to deceive his bank (the principal) in approving an increase in Client A’s credit limit and Client A’s fraudulent new loan. Also, the relationship manger could be liable for a series of other crimes including theft (transferring money from client’s account to his own), fraud and forgery. 

From the perspectives of customer service, it may be desirable for a relationship manager to provide personal service and act as the bank’s single point of contact for important clients. However, if all verification/clarification of questionable or doubtful transactions are routed through the relationship manager, it will undermine checks and balances and create opportunities for manipulations by unscrupulous relationship manager. 

Moreover, banks should adopt good control practices to remind supervisors to stay vigilant to potential risk of corrupt practices and make thorough enquiries into any suspected irregularities.

The relationship manager (agent) might have contravened Section 9(3) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) by using a false document (forged customer instruction) to deceive the bank (the principal). He might also be liable of a series of other crimes including theft, fraud and forgery. 

Some elderly customers may be vulnerable to exploitation as they may trust bank staff members (e.g. the relationship manager) to execute transactions on their behalves (e.g. signing blank instruction forms or giving their e-banking passwords) so as to save physical visits to the bank. 

The practice of keeping account advices for customers to collect later on is vulnerable to falsification or concealing irregularities. 

Furthermore, inactive, dormant accounts with a large balance or credit line are subject to the risk of exploitation, as the account owners may not monitor their accounts properly or may have changed addresses without informing the bank. 

Banks should devise control measures to protect dormant accounts from possible abuse and to avoid fraud. These control measures may include alerts on unusual fund movements, verification and confirmation with the customers, requirements for supervisors’ review/ override for transactions on inactive accounts, and requirements for identification of account holder when making withdrawals in person. Moreover, implementing requirements for staff members to take annual vacation leave, arranging and introducing a backup/ second officer to vulnerable customers, and practising staff rotation (say, on a three-year basis) may also help detect irregularities and misconduct at an early stage.